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STUDENT NOTES

BANKS AN]) BANKING - INSOLVENCY

PREFERENCE
AGAINST TRUST COMPANY EXECUTOR FOR FUNDS ON
DEPOSIT AT TESTATOR'S DEATH

Complications of considerable difficulty often arise when a
trust company, having trust funds deposited with its own banking department, becomes insolvent. The situation is further complicated if the funds were on general deposit in the banking department at the time the company took over its fiduciary obligations. The Supreme Court of South Carolina recently had to
deal with this problem.'
By his will, J. L. Michie named the People's Bank of Darlington his executor. The testator had on deposit in the bank
$8,120.71. This account was changed on the books to the name
of the bank as executor. The bank collected assets of the estate,
amounting to $763.22, and paid off obligations to the extent of
$2,573.78, leaving $6,310.15 of the estate funds in the bank at the
'Bx parte Michie, 165 S. E. 359 (S. 0., 1932).

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1933

1

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 2 [1933], Art. 5
STUDENT NOTES
time it failed. The liquid assets in the bank and in the hands
of the receiver had always exceeded the amount owed the estate.
The new administrator sought to charge the bank as trustee of
the claim. A preference was denied on the ground that no trust
res had been established.
Preferences have been established in favor of public funds
in somewhat analogous situations.
In a recent West Virginia
case, a county court was allowed a preferepce in the assets of an
insolvent bank for county funds held by the bank in excess of
the amount it could legally hold under the statute.' The court
emphasized both the fact that the case involved public -funds and
that the bank had violated a positive statute by retaining the excess. These facts probably justify a different result from that
reached in the principal ease.
The result of the Micdie case appears sound. The preference
was sought to be predicated upon the trust theory which assumes
some sort of a proprietary interest in the fund. Ordinarily, the
trust res must be traced into the fund.' Pretty clearly no res
existed here. The bank merely owed a debt to the estate of the
testator. It is fairly well settled that one cannot become trustee
of his own debt.' If the bank had paid the debt and then received
the money as executor, there would have been, at least, a tangible
res at the beginning.' Such a distinction, though logical, might
impress some as wanting in substance.
The explanation is the
fact that the case is so close to the line in fact that little practical basis for the distinction is discernible. The burden is on the
creditors, however, to show an equity superior to the position of
general creditors.' No attempt was made to impress a trust for
FMonongalia County Court v. Bank of the Monongahela Valley, 164 S. B.
695 (W. Va., 1932). For a discussion of this case see page 180.
3 W. VA. CODE ANN. (Barnes, 1923) c. 39, § 50. It is interesting to note
that the clause limiting the amount that could be deposited in one depository
to $100,000.00 appears to have been entirely omitted by the revisers. See
W. VA. REV. CODE (1931) c. 7, art. 6, § 1.
'Leach v. Sanborn State Bank, 203 Ia. 401, 212 N. W. 694 (1927); Ind.
School Dist. of Boyer v. King, 80 Ia. 497, 45 N. W. 908 (1890); State v.
Bank of Commerce, 61 Neb. 181, 85 N. W. 43 (1901); Yeldell v. People's
Bank, 118 S. C. 442, 110 S. E. 789 (1922); State v. Foster, 5 Wyo. 199,
385 Pac. 926 (1895).
Molera v. Cooper, 173 Cal. 259, 160 Pac. 231 (1916); Marble v. Marble,
304
Ill. 229, 136 N. E. 589 (1922).
5
Hamer v. Sidway, 124 N. Y. 538, 27 N. E. 256 (1891); Day v. Roth, 18
N. 7 Y. 448 (1858).

City of Lincoln v. Morrison, 64 Neb. 822, 90 N. .W. 905 (1902) ; Peurifoy
v. Boswell, 162 S. C. 107, 160 S. E. 156 (1931); White v. Commercial and
Farmers' Bank, 60 S. C. 127, 38 S. E. 453 (1901). It is conceded that in
a meritorious case, the court would be justified in brushing aside the strict
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the $763.22 collected by the bank after it became executor. Seemingly that sum was conceded to have been a part of the money
used in discharging obligations of the estate.
The court, however, concluded that even if these deposits had
been considered the same as money collected and deposited by
the bank after it became executor the result would have been the
same. It was admitted that an individual trustee could not have
so commingled the funds;8 but the court said a corporate trustee
stood on a different footing, in that it could properly deposit
trust funds in its own banking department. There is considerable
authority in accord with that view.' But when it is remembered
that such a general deposit necessarily divests the trust funds of
their trust character," some rather cogent objections can be
found.
It has long been recognized that a trustee may properly deposit trust funds temporarily in a bank so long as he uses reasonable diligence to select a solvent bank and deposits the funds in a
separate account. In such case, he is absolved from liability if
the bank fails,' the beneficiary having only a general claim
trust theory and giving a preference even if a satisfactory res could not be
found, for a theory should not stand in the way of justice. It is hard to
see, however, that the plaintiff's claim here deserved any more consideration
than the claim of any other depositor in the bank. The disadvantage of
having the fiduciary in control of the fund is usually offset by the existence
of 8 a fiduciary bond.
Hewitt v. Hays, 205 Mass. 356, 91 N. E. 332 (1910); Hallett's Case, 13
Chan. Div. 696 (1879).
"Bassett v. City Bank and Trust Co., 160 Atl. 60 (Conn., 1932); Hayward
v. Plant, 98 Conn. 374, 119 At. 341 (1923); St. Paul Trust Co. v. Kittson,
62 Minn. 408, 65 N. W. 74 (1895); Commonwealth v. Tradesmen's Trust
Co., 250 Pa. 378, 95 Atl. 577 (1915); Reid v. Reid, 237 Pa. 176, 85 Atl. 85
(1912); Hicks v. Corp. Commission, 201 N. C. 819, 161 S. E. 545 (1931);
Roebuck v. Surety Co., 200 N. C. 196, 156 S. E. 531 (1931); Bank Commissioners v. Security Trust Co., 70 N. H. 536, 49 Atl. 113 (1901); Tucker v.
New Hampshire Trust Co., 69 N. H. 187, 44 Atl. 927 (1897); In re People's
Trust Co., 169 App. Div. 699, 155 N. Y. Supp. 639 (1915); Herzog v. Title
Guaranty and Trust Co., 148 App. Div. 234, 132 N. Y. Supp. 1114 (1911);
aff'd., 210 N. Y. 531, 103 N. E. 885 (1913).
"First and Citizens' National Bank v. Corp. Commission, 201 N. C. 382,
160 S. E. 360 (1931). The legal effect of the transaction would be the
substitution of a chose in action as the trust res, the banking corporation
occupying the conceptually absurd positions of being both debtor and creditor
in trust of the obligation.
uBarney v. Saunders, 16 How. 535, 14 L, ed. 1047 (1853); Bertrand's
Succession, 127 La. 857, 54 So. 127 (1910); Jacobus v. Jacobus, 37 N. J.
Eq. 17 (1883); Mills v. Swearing-ton, 67 Tex. 269, 3 S. W. 268 (1887).
"Leach v. Farmers' Savings Bank, 205 Ia. 114, 213 N. W. 414 (1927);
Sherwood v. Central MWch, Savings Bank, 103 Mich. 109, 61 N. W. 352
(1894),
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against the closed bank. It would not only be a convenience but
also a distinct financial advantage to a trust company to have
authority to deposit trust funds in its own banking department.
But since this convenience is all on the side of the trust company,
even when it is solvent, and more especially when on the verge of
insolvency, since then it is under an undoubted temptation to use
trut funds to bolster up its own banking department, the rights
of the beneficiary deserve careful consideration. He no longer
has a disinterested trustee to look after his property. It is no
answer to say that the beneficiary could go into equity and have
a new trustee appointed or could demand that the funds be transferred to another bank. He usually does not discover the danger
until the damage is done.
On principle the corporate trustee should be treated the
same as the individual trustee in the matter of preferences." If
it has commingled the trust funds with its own funds in its
banking department, and they can be traced into the hands of
the receiver by any of the recognized methods of tracing which
would be employed against an individual trustee under similar
circumstances, that cash balance should be impressed with a trust
in favor of the beneficiary. It is difficult to justify a theory that
permits an officer of a trust company to receive trust funds and
then immediately divest the company of its fiduciary responsibility in caring for those funds by depositing the funds with the
company itself in a general bank account.'
The situation appears to be covered by statute in West Virginia.' The statute is broad enough to give a preference in favor
of trust funds improperly commingled with other funds of the
trust company without any requirement of tracing or following
the res.
-GEORGE

W. MCQUAMn.

'Terre Haute Trust Co. v. Scott, 181 N. E. 369 (Ind., 1932).
"W. VA. REv. CODE (1931) c. 31, art. 4, §§ 10-12; W. VA. CODE Am.
(Mchie, 1932) §§ 3132-3134.
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